The Role of Rumination and Reduced Concreteness in the Maintenance of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Depression Following Trauma by Ehring, Thomas et al.
Abstract Rumination has been linked to posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and
depression following trauma. A cross-sectional (N = 101) and a prospective longitudinal
study (N = 147) of road trafﬁc accident survivors assessed rumination, PTSD and
depression with self-report measures and structured interviews. We tested the hypoth-
eses that (1) rumination predicts the maintenance of PTSD and depression and (2)
reduced concreteness of ruminative thinking may be a maintaining factor. Rumination
signiﬁcantly predicted PTSD and depression at 6 months over and above what could be
predicted from initial symptom levels. In contrast to the second hypothesis, reduced
concreteness in an iterative rumination task was not signiﬁcantly correlated with self-
reported rumination frequency, and did not consistently correlate with symptom severity
measures. However, multiple regression analyses showed that the combination of
reduced concreteness and self-reported frequency of rumination predicted subsequent
PTSD better than rumination frequency alone. The results support the view that
rumination is an important maintaining factor of trauma-related emotional disorders.
Keywords: PTSD Æ Depression Æ Rumination Æ Trauma Æ
Concreteness
Introduction
Posttraumatic stress symptoms are common in the immediate aftermath of traumatic
experiences but only a minority of trauma survivors develops chronic psychological
problems. It therefore appears important to investigate which variables maintain
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  Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007posttraumatic stress symptoms (Ehlers & Steil, 1995; Schnurr, Lunney, & Sengupta,
2004). Ehlers and Clark (2000) suggested that one important maintaining factor in
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is rumination about the trauma and/or its
consequences.
1 Whereas much of the earlier literature on PTSD subsumed rumination
under the re-experiencing symptoms of PTSD (e.g., Greenberg, 1995; Holman & Silver,
1998), several theorists have recently argued that remembering the trauma
(re-experiencing) and repetitively thinking about it (rumination) are phenomenologi-
cally and functionally different forms of intrusive cognitions in PTSD (Ehlers & Clark,
2000; Joseph, Williams, & Yule, 1997). Intrusive re-experiencing is thought to be due to
characteristics of cognitive processing during the trauma and the resulting trauma
memory (Brewin & Holmes, 2003; Ehlers, Hackmann, & Michael, 2004), whereas
rumination is thought to be driven by problematic appraisals and can be regarded as an
important cognitive strategy used by individuals with PTSD to control perceived threat
(Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Joseph et al., 1997).
Some preliminary phenomenological studies indeed supported a distinction between
rumination and intrusive re-experiencing. Differences were found on a number of
dimensions, including content (evaluative thoughts vs. memories), type of cognition
(verbal thoughts vs. sensory impressions) and duration (minutes/hours vs. seconds)
(Evans, Ehlers, Mezey, & Clark, in press; Hackmann, Ehlers, Speckens, & Clark, 2004;
Michael, Ehlers, Halligan, & Clark, 2005; Speckens, Ehlers, Hackmann, Ruths, & Clark,
submitted).
In line with the hypothesis that rumination maintains PTSD, there is preliminary
evidence that repetitive and perseverative thinking about issues surrounding the trauma
such as its causes, consequences and implications predicts PTSD symptom severity
following traumatic events (Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999; Ehlers, Mayou, & Bryant, 1998;
Michael, Halligan, Clark, & Ehlers, in press; Murray, Ehlers, & Mayou, 2002; Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Steil & Ehlers, 2000). Prospective longitudinal studies
further found that rumination explains PTSD symptom severity over and above other
known predictors (Ehlers et al., 1998), and over and above diagnostic status at initial
assessment (Michael et al., in press).
Although past trauma research has largely focused on PTSD, traumatic experiences
can also trigger other disorders, especially major depression (e.g., Mayou, Bryant, &
Ehlers, 2001; O’Donnell, Creamer, Pattison, & Atkin, 2004). There is extensive
evidence that rumination is involved in the development and maintenance of depression
and is associated with a range of detrimental cognitive, emotional and social effects in
dysphoric individuals (for a review see Lyubomirsky & Tkach, 2004). However, only
one published study to date has investigated the role of rumination in the development
of depressive symptoms following trauma. Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1991)
assessed symptoms of depression in college students who had experienced the Loma
Prieta earthquake. The students had ﬁlled in a trait measure of depressive rumination
2 weeks prior to the earthquake. The authors found that trait levels of a ruminative
1 Rumination as deﬁned by Ehlers and Clark (2000) includes thoughts about the past as well as the
future. It could therefore be argued that these are two different forms of perseverative thinking, namely
‘worry’ (i.e., recurrent anxious thoughts about the future; see Borkovec, 1994) in addition to ‘rumination’
(i.e., recurrent negative thoughts about the past and the present; see Papageorgiou & Wells, 2004).
However, for reasons of simplicity and in line with Ehlers and Clark, only the term ‘rumination’ will be
used in this paper to describe perseverative thinking about the trauma and its consequences, including
thoughts about the past or present as well as anxious thoughts about the future.
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123response style to sad mood assessed before the event signiﬁcantly predicted post-event
levels of depression, even when initial symptoms of depression were controlled for.
In the studies described above, PTSD and depressive symptoms were assessed by
self-report measures so that it cannot be ruled out that response styles were partly
responsible for the observed associations. The present studies tested whether the
relationship between rumination and PTSD and depression after trauma can be
replicated using structured diagnostic interviews.
Furthermore, the present studies were designed to explore a possible mechanism by
which rumination may maintain PTSD. Theories regarding the role of recurrent
negative thinking in emotional disorders need to explain two features. First, although
recurrent negative thinking has been found to be associated with emotional disorders,
repeatedly thinking about one’s problems or anticipating possible future threats can also
be helpful in reaching one’s goals and successfully solving problems (King &
Pennebaker, 1996; Martin & Tesser, 1996). It therefore appears important to specify
how dysfunctional forms of recurrent thinking can be distinguished from functional ones
(see also Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 2004; Watkins, 2004). Second,
rumination and worry are typically described as involuntary and difﬁcult to control.
Once ruminative or worrisome thoughts are triggered in individuals with emotional
disorders, they tend to persevere for minutes or even hours (Borkovec, 1994; Speckens
et al., submitted). It therefore appears necessary to understand the self-perpetuating
properties of rumination in individuals with emotional disorders.
A number of different hypotheses have been developed to account for one or both of
these features of recurrent negative thinking (e.g., Borkovec, Alcaine, & Behar, 2004;
Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003; Startup & Davey, 2001; Wells, 1995). Several authors have
argued that functional and dysfunctional forms of recurrent thinking can be
distinguished on the basis of the mode in which information is processed. For example,
Teasdale (1999) and Watkins (2004) suggested that the detrimental effects of ruminative
self-focus are due to a conceptual-evaluative—as opposed to an experiential—mode of
processing meaning. Similarly, Borkovec and colleagues described worry as a form of
cognitive avoidance that is mainly based on verbal thinking and leads to the suppression
of visual imagery as well as the attenuation of physiological and emotional responding
to aversive stimuli, thereby inhibiting emotional processing (Borkovec, 1994; Borkovec
et al., 2004). Sto ¨ber further elaborated this idea in the reduced concreteness hypothesis
of worry (Sto ¨ber, 1998; Sto ¨ber & Borkovec, 2002). He proposed that worrying leads
to reduced imagery because it mainly consists of abstract thoughts that evoke less
imagery and physiological and emotional responses than thoughts of more concrete
content (see also Paivio, 1986). Although reduced concreteness might help to avoid
aversive imagery or strong emotions in the short term, it is thought to maintain
recurrent thinking because it is less likely than concrete thinking to produce a speciﬁc
conclusion and a suitable problem solution, and because it inhibits emotional
processing. The latter suggestion is in line with Foa and Kozak (1986) who suggested
that emotional processing requires the activation of the relevant emotional memory in
order to enable the integration of new information. Thinking about a problem or feared
situation in an abstract way may lead to an incomplete activation of the relevant
emotional memory, and may thus interfere with emotional processing.
Evidence for the reduced concreteness hypothesis of worry comes from three studies.
In two studies, participants were asked to describe problems or worries and their
potential consequences, and their answers were rated for levels of concreteness. Sto ¨ber,
Tepperwien, and Staak (2002, Study 1) found that students’ elaborations of ‘high-worry’
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123topics were less concrete than those of topics that they did not worry much about. In a
second study, patients with generalized anxiety disorder provided less concrete worry
descriptions than controls (Sto ¨ber & Borkovec, 2002). With successful cognitive
behavior therapy, the patients’ descriptions became more concrete.
In the third study, Sto ¨ber et al. (2002, Study 2) used the ‘Catastrophizing Interview’
originally developed by Vasey and Borkovec (1992). This interview assesses persever-
ative thinking about a worrisome topic in an iterative procedure by asking participants
to elaborate their concerns repeatedly. The degree of perseverative thinking is
operationalized as the number of steps completed in the interview. In addition, worry
content can be assessed from the answers given in the interview. The interview has
successfully been used by different researchers to test hypotheses regarding the process
and content of worry (Davey, Jubb, & Cameron, 1996; Davey & Levy, 1998, 1999;
Provencher, Freeston, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 2000; Startup & Davey, 2001, 2003),
depressive rumination (Watkins & Mason, 2002) and perseverative thinking in insomnia
(Harvey & Greenall, 2003). Sto ¨ber et al., (2002) compared the concreteness of answers
in the Catastrophizing Interview for topics that the student participants worried about to
those that they did not worry about, and found lower concreteness for ‘high-worry’
topics.
These ﬁndings provide preliminary support for the hypothesis that worry is
characterized by reduced concreteness. It is conceivable that trauma-related rumination
in PTSD may similarly be characterized by reduced concreteness. If this is the case, low
concreteness may be one mechanism by which rumination maintains PTSD. According
to Ehlers and Clark (2000), recovery from posttraumatic stress symptoms depends on an
elaboration of the trauma memory and a modiﬁcation of problematic appraisals. Both
processes require the processing of information on very concrete levels, and thinking
about the trauma in an abstract way is unlikely to produce changes in the trauma
memory or appraisals.
The studies reported in this paper had two aims. First, we aimed to replicate earlier
reports on the role of rumination in predicting PTSD and depression, using both self-
reports of symptom severity and structured diagnostic interviews. It was expected that
rumination is concurrently and prospectively related to the severity of PTSD and
depressive symptoms and that it signiﬁcantly predicts symptoms at follow-up over and
above initial symptom levels. Second, we aimed to test whether the reduced
concreteness hypothesis of perseverative thinking applies to rumination in trauma
survivors. It was expected that (a) self-reported rumination is signiﬁcantly related to
reduced concreteness of answers in an iterative Rumination Interview that is based on
the Catastrophizing Interview, (b) reduced concreteness is signiﬁcantly related to
the perseveration of negative thinking in the interview (i.e., the number of steps) and
(c) reduced concreteness is signiﬁcantly related to symptom levels of PTSD and
depression.
Method
Participants
Participants had attended King’s College Hospital’s Accident and Emergency (A&E)
Department, London, following injury in a road trafﬁc accident. Inclusion criteria were:
injury in a road trafﬁc accident as a driver, passenger, motorcyclist, or cyclist; injuries
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123exceeded triage category ‘blue’ (very mild injuries); age between 18 and 65; address in
greater London. Exclusion criteria were: left before receiving medical treatment;
attended the A&E Department more than 3 days after the accident; current psychosis
or suicidality.
Study 1: cross-sectional investigation
The sample comprised 101 participants (56% male; age: M = 34.95, SD = 10.60) who
had experienced a road trafﬁc accident between 3 and 12 months prior to their
participation in the study. These participants were interviewed on one occasion.
Twenty-three percent of participants had experienced the accident as a car driver, 22%
as a passenger, 29% as a motorcyclist and 27% as a bicyclist. The A&E triage scores
were used to approximate injury severity in this sample. Sixty-ﬁve percent of
participants received the triage category ‘green’ (minor injuries), 29% the category
‘yellow’ (urgent) and 6% the category ‘red’ (life-threatening). The majority of
participants (85%) were discharged from hospital within 24 h of their accident.
Detailed information about sample and accident characteristics is given elsewhere
(Ehring, Ehlers, & Glucksman, in press).
Study 2: prospective longitudinal investigation
The second sample comprised 147 participants (67% male; age: M = 35.17, SD = 9.40).
Participants were either approached by a researcher on the day of their accident while
attending the A&E Department (n = 53) or contacted via letter and telephone within
the ﬁrst week following their accident (n = 94). Results for these subgroups did not
differ. Participants attended an interview session at 2 weeks after the accident, and were
followed for 6 months. Thirty percent of participants in Study 2 had experienced the
accident as car drivers, 16% as passengers, 38% as motorcyclists and 26% as bicyclists.
Sixty percent of participants received the triage category ‘green’ (minor injuries), 36%
the category ‘yellow’ (urgent) and 4% the category ‘red’ (life-threatening). The mean
injury severity score (ISS) (Baker, O’Neil, Haddon, & Long, 1974) in this sample was
2.12 (SD = 2.34, min =0 ,max = 13). As in Study 1, the majority of participants (89%)
were discharged from hospital within 24 h of the accident. Detailed information about
sample and accident characteristics is given elsewhere (Ehring, Ehlers, & Glucksman, in
preparation).
Table 1 shows the prevalences of acute stress disorder (ASD), PTSD and major
depression in the two samples, as assessed with the Structured Clinical Interview for the
DSM-IV (SCID; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1996). In both studies, a high
comorbidity between the disorders was found: Forty-one percent (Study 1) and 52%
(Study 2) of participants with ASD/PTSD at the initial assessments also met criteria for
major depression; and 64% (Study 1) and 86% (Study 2) of participants with major
depression also suffered from PTSD.
Measures and tasks
Diagnoses and symptom severities
In both studies, PTSD and major depression were assessed with the SCID (First et al.,
1996). In Study 2 only, the Acute Stress Disorder Scale (ASDS; Bryant & Harvey, 2000)
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participant’s responses to the ASDS, the researcher rated the presence or absence of
DSM-IV symptom criteria for ASD. Interrater-reliabilities for the SCID and ASDS
interviews were high (PTSD: j = .82; ASD: j = .93; major depression: j =1 ,N =5 6
randomly chosen interviews from this and a related study, two raters). The SCID
manual states that j‘s above .70 indicate good reliability (First et al., 1996).
Posttraumatic stress disorder symptom severity was assessed using the Posttraumatic
Diagnostic Scale (PDS; Foa, Cashman, Jaycox, & Perry, 1997), a validated and widely
used self-report measure of PTSD symptom severity. The Beck Depression Inventory
(BDI; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979), a standardized questionnaire of established
reliability and validity, assessed the severity of depressive symptoms.
Self-report rumination measures
The rumination subscale of the Responses to Intrusions Questionnaire (RIQ) was used to
assess rumination about the trauma and/or its consequences. This self-report question-
naire assesses different aspects of trauma survivors’ responses to intrusive memories. It
was developed in a series of studies (Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999; Halligan, Clark, & Ehlers,
2002; Murray et al., 2002; Steil & Ehlers, 2000) and has shown good reliability and
predictive validity. The rumination subscale consists of eight items (e.g., I think about
why the event happened to me; I think about how life would have been different if the
event had not occurred; Study 1: a = .80; Study 2: a = .86), rated on a scale from 0
(never)t o3( always).
The rumination scale of the Response Style Questionnaire (RSQ; Nolen-Hoeksema &
Morrow, 1991) was used to assess depressive rumination deﬁned as perseverative
thinking about one’s symptoms of depression and possible causes and consequences of
these symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2004). The full rumination scale of the RSQ has
been used widely in clinical as well as non-clinical populations and has demonstrated
high reliability and validity (Luminet, 2004; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2004). A ten-item short
version of the questionnaire was found to show psychometric properties equivalent to
the full scale (S. Nolen-Hoeksema, personal communication) and was therefore used in
this project. Participants rated each item (e.g., I think about how sad I feel) on a scale
from 1 (never)t o4( always), reﬂecting how often they had this thought when they were
feeling sad, down or depressed. The internal consistency of the scale was a = .92 in
Study 1 and a = .89 in Study 2.
Table 1 Prevalences of PTSD and major depression in the two studies according to the structured
clinical interview for DSM-IV
Study 1 (N = 101) Study 2
Diagnosis Prevalence (n, %) Diagnosis Prevalence (n,% )
Assessment at 2 weeks (N = 147)
PTSD 22 (21.8%) ASD 23 (15.5%)
Major depression 11 (10.9%) PTSD
a 33 (22.4%)
Major depression 14 (9.6%)
Assessment at 6 months (N = 140)
PTSD 17 (12.1%)
Major depression 11 (7.8%)
PTSD posttraumatic stress disorder, ASD acute stress disorder
a Without criterion E (duration for at least 1 month)
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The Rumination Interview generated the material for ratings of the concreteness of the
participants’ ruminative thoughts. It was adapted from the Catastrophizing Interviews
used by Vasey and Borkovec (1992) and Davey and Levy (1998). To familiarize
participants with the procedure, they were ﬁrst taken through an example of the
interview format, using a concern unrelated to the trauma (concern about being late for
work). Participants were then instructed to continue answering the interview questions
until they had sufﬁciently explored their concern. This instruction was chosen as earlier
research investigating the effects of varying stop rules on perseveration in the task have
found this condition to best distinguish between groups of high vs. low worriers or
ruminators (‘as many as can’ stop rule; Startup & Davey, 2001, 2003; Watkins & Mason,
2002).
In the ﬁrst part of the interview (trauma-related rumination), participants were asked
to identify their main current concern related to the accident (‘What is it that concerns
you most about the accident?’). When the participant had named their concern ‘X’, the
interview started with the question ‘What is it that concerns you most about X?’. The
answer Y was followed by the interviewer’s question ‘What is it that concerns you most
about Y?’ and so forth. After 7, 14 and 21 answers (‘steps’), the experimenter reminded
participants that they could end the interview when they had reached the goal of
sufﬁciently exploring their concern. The interview continued until participants indicated
that they wanted to end the procedure.
For the second part of the interview (depressive rumination), participants were asked
to identify a topic of current or recent sad mood. The interview followed the same
procedure, with the question asked being ‘Why is it that X makes you feel sad?’. This
part was identical to the interview used by Watkins and Mason (2002).
Some participants were unable to identify a current concern related to the trauma or
a topic of current or recent sad mood. The number of participants for whom Rumination
Interview data was available was n = 83 for the trauma-related rumination part and
n = 84 for the depressive rumination part in Study 1; and n = 114 for the trauma-related
rumination part and n = 96 for the depressive rumination part in Study 2. Participants
with vs. those without disorders were equally likely to be unable to identify a topic for
the interview (all v
2 < .93, all P > .41).
The interviews were audio taped and transcribed verbatim. The number of steps
generated by each participant in each of the interview parts was calculated. A graduate
student of psychology rated the concreteness of the participants’ answers from the
interview transcripts on the scale developed by Sto ¨ber and colleagues (Sto ¨ber &
Borkovec, 2002; Sto ¨ber et al., 2002), which consists of ﬁve categories: 1 (abstract), 2
(somewhat abstract), 3 (neither–nor), 4 (somewhat concrete) and 5 (concrete). The
category ‘abstract’ is deﬁned as ‘indistinct, cross-situational, equivocal, unclear,
aggregated’. The category ‘concrete’ is deﬁned as ‘distinct, situationally speciﬁc,
unequivocal, clear, singular’. The rater was blind to the participants’ diagnostic status
and did not know which interview parts were generated by the same individual. Each
answer was rated separately, and mean concreteness scores for each of the two interview
parts (trauma-related rumination and depressive rumination) were computed.
In order to assess the inter-rater reliability of the concreteness ratings, 20 randomly
chosen trauma-related Rumination Interviews and 20 randomly chosen depressive
Rumination Interviews were independently rated by the ﬁrst author. The single measure
494 Cogn Ther Res (2008) 32:488–506
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rumination part and .71 for the depressive rumination part). This is similar to the
reliability of ratings reported by Sto ¨ber and Borkovec (2002).
Two different Rumination Interview parts were used to increase the reliability of
assessment and to investigate possible content speciﬁcity of rumination about the
trauma and depressive rumination. However, largely identical results were found for the
two parts. Therefore, the two interview parts were combined and the mean number of
steps as well as mean concreteness ratings computed.
2 For reasons of brevity, only
results for these overall scores will be reported.
Design and procedure
The study was approved by the local research ethics committees and participants gave
written informed consent.
Study 1
After agreeing to take part in the study, participants received a pack of questionnaires,
including the rumination and the symptom severity measures as well as some measures
unrelated to the analyses presented here. Participants ﬁlled in the questionnaires on the
day before attending an assessment session. During the session, the participants
completed the Rumination Interview and the SCID, as well as some additional tasks
unrelated to the analyses presented here. All assessments were conducted by the ﬁrst
author. Participants received £30 as a reimbursement for their time.
Study 2
The study comprised four assessments. At approximately 2 weeks posttrauma, partic-
ipants attended a session, which was identical to the session in Study 1. Symptom
severity measures were repeated at three postal follow-up assessments (1, 3 and
6 months following the accident). At the 6-month follow-up, the SCID was also
repeated by telephone. Self-report rumination measures were repeated at 1 month
posttrauma because a previous study (Murray et al., 2002) had suggested that the
predictive power of rumination increases with time. The session as well as the ﬁrst
follow-up assessment also contained some additional tasks and/or questionnaires
unrelated to the analyses presented here. Participants received £50 as a reimbursement
for their time.
Data analyses
Variables were transformed to normal via square root or logarithmic transformations
prior to analyses if necessary. Diagnostic groups were compared with t-tests. Pearson’s
product–moment correlation coefﬁcients were computed to investigate the relationship
between variables of interest.
2 For nine participants, only data from one of the interview parts was available and therefore the
available score was used in the analyses. Excluding these participants from the analyses did not change
the results.
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Self-report rumination measures
Relationship between self-reported rumination and outcome measures
Table 2 shows the group differences in rumination between participants with and
without disorders following the trauma. The t-tests showed that participants with ASD,
PTSD or major depression reported more rumination about the trauma (RIQ) and
more depressive rumination (RSQ) than participants without these disorders. Table 3
shows the correlations between self-reported rumination and symptom severity
measures at the different time points across both studies. Rumination about the trauma
(RIQ) as well as depressive rumination (RSQ) correlated signiﬁcantly with PTSD and
depressive symptom severities at all assessments.
For Study 2, partial correlations tested whether rumination predicts symptoms at
6 months over and above what can be predicted from initial symptom levels. Trauma-
related rumination measured at 2 weeks predicted PTSD symptom severity at
6 months over and above symptom levels at 2 weeks (partial r = .27, P < .01).
Similarly, trauma-related rumination measured at 1 month predicted PTSD symptom
severity at 6 months over and above symptom levels at 1 month (partial r = .38,
P < .001). Likewise, self-reported depressive rumination measured at 2 weeks
predicted BDI scores at 6 months over and above what was predicted from initial
depressive symptoms at 2 weeks (partial r = .30, P < .01), and similarly for the
1-month measures (partial r = .27, P < .01).
Additional analyses
Additional analyses were conducted to rule out the possibility that correlations between
the rumination scales and the PDS were due to the participants’ failure to distinguish
between re-experiencing and rumination. We computed adjusted PTSD symptom
severity scores, omitting the re-experiencing items. All correlations and partial
correlations between the rumination scales and PTSD severity remained signiﬁcant
for the adjusted score and were almost identical to those shown in Table 3.
We further computed partial correlations in order to test whether there were speciﬁc
associations between trauma-related rumination and PTSD on the one hand, and
between depressive rumination and depression on the other hand. For concurrent
assessments, PTSD symptom severities were still signiﬁcantly correlated with both
trauma-related (r’s > .37) as well as depressive rumination scores (r’s > .21) in both
samples when statistically controlling for symptom levels of depression. Similarly, BDI
scores still showed signiﬁcant correlations with depressive rumination (r’s > .50) and
trauma-related rumination (r’s > .36) when controlling for PDS scores. However, for
the prediction of future symptom levels in Sample 2, speciﬁc associations emerged.
PTSD symptom severities at 6 months follow-up were only signiﬁcantly predicted by
trauma-related rumination (partial r = .35, P < .001), but not by depressive rumination
at initial assessment (partial r = .05, P = .60) when symptom levels of depression were
partialled out. Similarly, only depressive rumination (partial r = .26, P < .01), but not
trauma-related rumination (partial r = .09, P = .32), predicted BDI scores at 6 months
when PDS scores were partialled out.
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123Relationship between rumination measures and stability of rumination scores
Trauma-related (RIQ) and depressive rumination (RSQ) scores correlated substantially
at all assessments, Study 1: r = .57, P < .001; Study 2, 2 weeks: r = .55, P < .001,
1 month: r = .69, P < .001.
In order to test the stability of rumination scores in Study 2, analyses of variance with
‘diagnostic group’ as between-subject factor and ‘time of assessment’ as within-subject
factor were conducted. For trauma-related rumination scores, a signiﬁcant interaction
between ‘ASD at 2 weeks’ and ‘time of assessment’ was found, F(1, 119) = 5.44,
P < .05. Follow-up tests showed that the degree of trauma-related rumination (RIQ)
signiﬁcantly decreased from 2 weeks to 1 month in participants without ASD, M = 4.55,
SD = 3.45 vs. M = 3.71, SD = 3.38; t(105) = 4.29, P < .001, whereas participants with
ASD did not show a change in rumination scores during this interval, M = 10.40,
SD = 5.58 vs. M = 10.93, SD = 5.43, t(14) = -.75, P = .47. For depressive rumination
scores (RSQ), there was no signiﬁcant main effect of ‘time of assessment’,
F(1, 121) = .55, P = .46 nor a signiﬁcant interaction between ‘depression at 2 weeks’
and ‘time of assessment’, F(1, 121) = .23, P = .63.
Rumination Interview
Number of steps
In Study 1, participants generated a mean of M = 7.39 steps in the trauma-related
rumination part, SD = 3.65, min =2 ,max = 20, and M = 6.33 steps in the depressive
rumination part of the Rumination Interview, SD = 3.69, min =2 ,max = 23. For Study
2, the numbers were a mean of M = 7.11 steps in the trauma-related rumination part,
SD = 4.13, min =2 ,max = 24, and M = 6.71 steps in the depressive rumination part,
SD = 3.85, min =2 ,max = 25. As shown in Table 3, the mean number of steps in the
interviews correlated signiﬁcantly with self-report levels of rumination.
Concreteness ratings
In neither study did concreteness of answers in the Rumination Interview correlate with
self-reported rumination. In Study 1, but not in Study 2, mean concreteness ratings were
signiﬁcantly correlated with the number of steps in the interview.
Study 1 found neither signiﬁcant correlations between mean concreteness ratings and
symptom severity scores (see Table 3), nor signiﬁcant group differences (see Table 2).
In Study 2, concreteness in the Rumination Interview at 2 weeks was signiﬁcantly
negatively related to depressive symptom severity at 3 and 6 months (Table 3).
Similarly, there were signiﬁcant differences between participants with and without
major depression in concreteness levels at 2 weeks (Table 2). For PTSD symptoms,
there were no signiﬁcant correlations (Table 3) or group differences (Table 2)a t
2 weeks or 6 months. Concreteness at 2 weeks, however, was negatively related to
PTSD symptom severity at 1 and 3 months.
Regression analyses
In order to test whether concreteness of ruminative thinking improves the prediction of
symptom levels of PTSD or depression in comparison to the prediction by the frequency
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123of rumination alone, we conducted hierarchical regression analyses with symptom
scores as dependent variables. In the ﬁrst step, z-transformed self-reported rumination
scores were entered, followed by z-transformed concreteness scores in the second step
and the interaction between the two (product of the z-transformed scores) in the third
step.
In all analyses with PTSD symptom scores as dependent variable, the frequency of
trauma-related rumination entered in the ﬁrst step signiﬁcantly predicted symptom
severity. In all but one analysis the prediction of PTSD symptom severities could
signiﬁcantly be improved by either concreteness scores or the interaction between
concreteness scores and self-reported rumination entered as additional predictor
variables, although the additional amount of variance was small and ranged between 3
and 4% (see Table 4).
Regression analyses with symptom levels of depression as dependent variables only
showed signiﬁcant effects for the self-reported frequency of depressive rumination.
However, neither concreteness scores nor the interaction between concreteness and
self-reported rumination scores signiﬁcantly improved the prediction of depressive
symptom severities (all |b| < .17, all ps > .06).
Discussion
The ﬁrst aim of this study was to replicate earlier ﬁndings regarding the role of
rumination in the maintenance of PTSD and depression following trauma. In line with
previous studies (e.g., Ehlers et al., 1998; Murray et al., 2002), self-reported rumination
about the trauma was signiﬁcantly and substantially correlated with the severity of
PTSD symptoms. Rumination was not only related to concurrent PTSD symptoms, but
Table 4 Regression analyses: predicting concurrent and subsequent PTSD severity by self-reported
rumination and concreteness at 2 weeks
Study 1 Study 2
PDS scores PDS at
2 weeks
PDS at
1 month
PDS at
3 months
PDS at
6 months
b DR
2 b DR
2 b DR
2 b DR
2 b D R
2
Step 1 .47** .43** .29** .29** .28**
Trauma-related rumination
(RIQ)
.68** .65** .54** .54** .53**
Step 2 .03* .01 .03* .04* .01
Trauma-related rumination
(RIQ)
.71** .65** .53** .53** .53**
Concreteness ratings –.18* .11 –.17* –.19* –.12
Step 3 .01 .00 .00 .00 .03*
Trauma-related rumination
(RIQ)
.76** .65** .53** .53** .53**
Concreteness ratings –.17* –.13 –.18* –.20* –.15
Interaction –.13 .04 –.02 –.03 –.17*
PDS Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale, RIQ trauma-related rumination, as assessed with the Responses to
Intrusions Questionnaire
*P < .05
**P < .001
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123also predicted subsequent symptoms at 6 months. Rumination predicted a substantial
amount of the variance (between 36 and 50%) of PTSD symptom severity. The ﬁndings
extended those of previous studies in that rumination not only predicted self-reported
PTSD symptoms, but also a diagnosis of ASD at 2 weeks, and a diagnosis of PTSD at
6 months after the traumatic event. In addition, rumination predicted the severity of
PTSD symptoms over and above what could be predicted from initial symptom levels.
In sum, the results of the present studies clearly support the view that rumination is an
important maintaining factor of PTSD following trauma, as suggested by recent
theoretical accounts (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Joseph et al., 1997).
In an earlier study by Murray et al. (2002), rumination assessed at 1-week
posttrauma was found to predict PTSD symptom levels at the 6-month follow-up to a
much lower degree than rumination assessed at 1 month after the event. In contrast to
this earlier ﬁnding, the present study did not ﬁnd differences in the predictive power
of rumination assessed at 2 or 4 weeks. Both showed high correlations with PTSD
severity at follow-up. This suggests that rumination is a powerful predictor from 2
weeks onwards.
This ﬁnding is of considerable interest for the early detection of people at risk for
chronic PTSD. Research into early intervention following trauma has shown discour-
aging results for debrieﬁng interventions that are offered to every trauma survivor,
whereas a course of cognitive-behavioral interventions with individuals at high risk of
chronic PTSD has been shown to be effective (for a review see McNally, Bryant, &
Ehlers, 2003). The present study suggests that the assessment of rumination might help
improve the early identiﬁcation of trauma survivors in need of early intervention, given
that rumination was highly predictive of PTSD at 6 months and that it predicted over
and above initial symptom levels. This idea is further supported by the ﬁnding that the
degree of trauma-related rumination remained high between 2 weeks and 1 month in
participants with ASD whereas participants without the disorder showed a reduction in
the frequency of ruminative thinking during this interval.
In the past, trauma-related rumination and re-experiencing symptoms have some-
times been treated as a unitary phenomenon (e.g., Greenberg, 1995; Holman & Silver,
1998). However, recent theoretical models of PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Joseph
et al., 1997) as well as results from recent phenomenological studies (Evans et al., in
press; Michael et al., 2005, in press; Speckens et al., submitted) suggest that rumination
and re-experiencing are conceptually and phenomenologically distinct. This view is
supported by our ﬁndings that rumination still predicted the maintenance of PTSD
when initial symptoms were statistically controlled for and that the size of the
correlations did not change when PTSD symptom severity was calculated omitting the
re-experiencing symptoms. Thus, the relationship between rumination and PTSD found
in this study cannot be explained by a possible lack of discrimination between
rumination and re-experiencing in the participants’ answers.
Although there is extensive evidence that rumination is involved in the development
and maintenance of depression (see Lyubomirsky & Tkach, 2004 for a review), only one
study to date has investigated the role of rumination in the development of depression
following trauma (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). In this study, depressive
rumination assessed prior to the traumatic experience signiﬁcantly predicted posttrauma
symptoms of depression. The present results extend this ﬁnding by showing that levels
of depressive rumination assessed after the trauma are also signiﬁcantly associated with
concurrent and subsequent levels of depression. In addition, it could be shown that
rumination assessed shortly after the trauma predicts depression at follow-up over and
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123above initial symptom levels and that rumination not only predicts self-reported levels
of depressive symptoms but also a diagnosis of major depression.
Rumination has been identiﬁed as a maintaining factor in a number of emotional
disorders and it remains unclear whether different types of perseverative thinking
identiﬁed in different emotional disorders represent similar or different processes
(Harvey et al., 2004). The present results suggest a relationship between trauma-related
rumination and depressive rumination. The RIQ and RSQ were moderately to highly
correlated, and both measures predicted both PTSD and depression. These ﬁndings may
have been inﬂuenced by the high comorbidity between PTSD and depression in the
present samples, as nearly all participants with depression also met criteria for PTSD or
subthreshold PTSD. The nature of the samples thus did not allow a direct comparison
between rumination in trauma survivors who have PTSD, but no depression, and those
who have depression, but no PTSD. However, partial correlations in the prospective
study provided preliminary evidence for a speciﬁc association between trauma-related
rumination and PTSD symptom severity on the one hand (controlling for depressive
symptoms), and between depressive rumination and severity of depressive symptoms on
the other hand (controlling for PTSD symptoms). It would be desirable in future studies
to identify groups of trauma survivors that are more clearly separated by their
diagnostic status, for example, by including mixed groups of trauma survivors who have
suffered loss or threat to life.
Despite evidence that rumination is involved in the maintenance of emotional
disorders following trauma, to our knowledge, no published study to date has
investigated the process by which rumination might maintain posttraumatic stress
symptoms. Self-report measures used to date mainly assess the frequency and content of
rumination and therefore appear to be of limited use when studying the processes
underlying perseverative thinking. The present studies therefore adapted the Catastro-
phizing Interview to investigate process characteristics of rumination in trauma
survivors. The original paradigm has repeatedly been shown to be useful in studying
factors underlying chronic worry (e.g., Davey et al., 1996; Startup & Davey, 2001). In
the studies reported here, the number of steps in the Rumination Interview was
signiﬁcantly related to self-reported rumination, providing initial evidence that
perseveration in the interviews is indeed related to naturally occurring perseverative
thinking. However, as in most earlier studies (e.g., Startup & Davey, 2001; Watkins &
Mason, 2002), correlations were only modest.
The answers given in the Rumination Interview were analyzed to test the reduced
concreteness theory of recurrent negative thinking in emotional disorders (Sto ¨ber, 1998)
in the context of trauma-related PTSD and depression. Three different hypotheses were
derived from the theory. First, it was expected that recurrent negative thinking is
characterized by reduced concreteness. This hypothesis had found initial empirical
support in studies of non-clinical worry and generalized anxiety disorder (Sto ¨ber &
Borkovec, 2002; Sto ¨ber et al., 2002). The present studies failed to show a relationship
between self-reported rumination and level of concreteness in the Rumination Interview.
Differences between the present results and Sto ¨ber et al.’s ﬁndings may be due to
differences in methodology, or differences between worry about future events and
rumination about a past event. As to methodological differences, Sto ¨ber et al.’s positive
results with the Catastrophic Interview technique were based on within-subject compar-
isons showing that the (non-clinical) participants’ thinking about topics that they worried
about was less concrete than their thinking about non-worry topics. The present studies
used between-subject and correlational analyses of rumination about the same topic,
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123which may have less power than a within-subject comparison. Furthermore, in contrast to
Sto ¨beret al.’sstudy(2002),allparticipantswereinterviewedaboutarecentveryupsetting
event, and this may have led to a reduced range in concreteness ratings compared to the
range of concreteness for worry and non-worry topics in Sto ¨ber et al.’s study.
The results may also point to possible differences between worry and rumination.
Worry and rumination have so far mainly been distinguished on the basis of their
content, in that rumination is typically associated with thinking about the past, whereas
worry represents anxious thoughts about future events (Fresco, Frankel, Mennin, Turk,
& Heimberg, 2002; Segerstrom, Tsao, Alden, & Craske, 2000). The anticipation of
future events (as in worry) may lend itself to a greater range of levels of concreteness
than thoughts about past experiences that have already happened (as in rumination),
which are by deﬁnition more concrete than future events. The investigation of
concreteness vs. abstractness of thinking about the past might therefore need a more
ﬁne-grained analysis than reﬂected by the concreteness rating scale developed by Sto ¨ber
and colleagues. This may apply especially when looking at concerns related to a trauma,
which is a speciﬁc event with sometimes very concrete worrying consequences such as
physical injuries and the need for further operations.
A second hypothesis derived from the reduced concreteness theory was that
reduced concreteness is involved in the perseveration of negative thinking in
individuals suffering from emotional disorders. In line with this idea, Study 1 showed
a signiﬁcant relationship between the number of steps generated in the Rumination
Interview and concreteness ratings. However, Study 2 did not replicate this result. It is
conceivable that the observed relationship with reduced concreteness only applies to
chronic forms of rumination, as the negative ﬁndings in Study 2 were obtained only
2 weeks after the event, when the event may have been very prominent on all
participants’ minds. Thus, the ﬁndings of Study 1 need replication before further
conclusions can be drawn.
Finally, we hypothesized that if functional and dysfunctional ways of recurrent
thinking about problems or negative experiences differ in concreteness, then reduced
concreteness should predict the severity of psychological problems after trauma. This
hypothesis received some, but overall weak support in Study 2, which found signiﬁcant
group differences in concreteness between participants with and without major
depression at 2 weeks after the accident, and correlations between low concreteness
at 2 weeks and severity of depressive symptoms at 3 and 6 months. There were also
some correlations between low concreteness and PTSD symptom severity. Overall, the
correlations were small. The hypothesis received some further support as multiple
regression analyses showed that PTSD symptoms at 6 months were better predicted by
the combination of the frequency of trauma-related rumination and reduced concrete-
ness of ruminative thinking at initial assessment than by rumination frequency alone.
Overall, the results were disappointing and only showed weak support for the view that
reduced concreteness of thinking about the trauma is associated with the maintenance
of depression and PTSD following trauma. The results need to be interpreted with great
caution as correlations and group differences were non-signiﬁcant for some of the time
points and concreteness in the rumination task did not correlate with self-reported
rumination. More research is needed before any ﬁrm conclusions regarding the role of
reduced concreteness in trauma-related rumination can be drawn. Future studies should
especially aim to improve the assessment of concreteness. The measure used in this
study might have lacked sensitivity as some of the problems that participants worried
about were by deﬁnition concrete (physical and ﬁnancial problems), and the measure
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123only consisted of one global rating. Thus, a reﬁned assessment of concreteness may show
stronger relationships with self-reported rumination and with psychopathology. In
addition, alternative hypotheses regarding the processes by which rumination maintains
PTSD should be developed and tested.
In sum, results from the present studies replicated and extended earlier ﬁndings
regarding the role of rumination in the maintenance of emotional disorders following
trauma. Rumination at 2 weeks and 1 month after the trauma appears to be an
important predictor of PTSD. In addition, there was very preliminary support for a role
of the style or mode of ruminative thinking. However, the hypotheses that frequent
rumination and perseveration in the Rumination Interviews are associated with reduced
concreteness were only partially supported. More research is needed to replicate and
extend these results as well as clarify the disparate ﬁndings between the two studies.
A number of limitations of the studies are noteworthy. First, although a prospective
longitudinal design was used in Study 2, the results remain correlational. Future studies
are needed that manipulate rumination and its characteristics such as concreteness
experimentally and test the effect of these manipulations on symptom severities.
Second, the high comorbidity between PTSD and depression in the samples studied did
not allow a direct comparison between rumination in different diagnostic groups. Future
studies comparing clearly distinct diagnostic groups are needed to investigate similar-
ities and differences between different types of perseverative thinking in PTSD and
depression. Third, other measures of concreteness may have shown stronger relation-
ships with self-reported rumination and symptom measures. Finally, it remains unclear
whether low concreteness is an important dimension underlying dysfunctional forms of
recurrent negative thinking. Alternative approaches suggest that functional and
dysfunctional ways of thinking about problems or negative experiences can rather be
distinguished by the amount of imagery vs. verbal processes involved (Borkovec, 1994;
Borkovec et al., 2004) or the degree of conceptual-evaluative vs. experiential self-focus
(Teasdale, 1999; Watkins, 2004). Although these views appear to be related, future
theoretical as well as empirical work is needed to clarify the relationship between these
processes and isolate the most relevant dimensions involved in the maintenance of
PTSD and depression after trauma. Such research may point toward possible ways of
directly targeting dysfunctional rumination in treatment.
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